Abstract. Minghua Qu and Vanstone [2] have proposed a public-key cryptosystem (FGM) which is based on factorizations of a binary vector space (i.e., transversal logarithmic signatures of an elementary abelian 2-group). In this paper a generalized (basis-independent) decryption algorithm is given, which shows that there are many equivalent private keys, and a method of efficiently obtaining such an equivalent private key is given. The FGM cryptosystem is thus rendered insecure. Although the FGM cryptosystem is defined in terms of linear algebra, the attack given here is essentially group-theoretic in nature. Thus this attack throws doubt on any cryptosystem which relies on the security of transversal logarithmic signatures.
Introduction
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the Finite Group Mappings (FGM) public-key cryptosystem proposed by Minghua Qu and Vanstone [2] and a generalized decryption algorithm for FGM which shows that there are many equivalent private keys. Section 3 constructs part of such an equivalent private key from the public key. The next two sections show how to decrypt with this information and construct the rest of an equivalent private key. The final section gives some conclusions.
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The FGM Public-Key Cryptosystem
Let n be an integer such that n>4 and n=0 mod 4. We describe the public-key system given in [2] , which encrypts (n -4)-bit messages into n-bit ciphertexts.
Let G .'= Z~ be a vector space over Z 2 of dimension n and let {al, (~2,.. ", (xn} be an arbitrary basis for G. Define a chain of subspaces 
Then A~ is a complete set of coset representatives of G i in G~_ 1.
For all integers i and h such that n/4 <_ i <_ n/2 -2 and 0 _< h _< 3, define
where the elements ~[i, Jib are arbitrary elements of G subject to the condition that, for any t 1 , t 2 E {0, 1},
Clearly, for any h ~ {0, 1, 2, 3}, .~, h is a complete set of coset representatives of G i in Gi_ 1. Define f to be any one-to-one function such that ( n)(n n)
Finally, when i is an integer such that 1 < i < n/4 -1, we define 
The public key is the collection of blocks n A i where 1 <i<~--1.
In [2] the private key is given as the collection of blocks n .~ where 1 <i<~--1, the collection of blocks n n "~h where ~ <i<---2 and
the function f, and the basis {al ..... a,}. In fact, we haay reduce the amount of information contained in the private key_and still decrypt efficiently. We take the private key to be the blocks A i and Ai, h, the function f, and, instead of the basis {a l .... , an}, the chain of subspaces (1) . We now give a description of the encryption process. An (n -4)-bit message may be regarded as an integer m such that 0 < m _< 2 n-4 --1. To encrypt, we first express m in hexadecimal as (Pl .... , Pn/6-1), so 0 < Pi < 15, where m = Pl + 16p2 + "'" + 16n/4-lpn/4-1 "
We define an element g ~ G by g:= a [1, pl] +a [2, pz] 
Now,
we can write g as a binary n-tuple (ql ..... qn) which we may regard as a number between 0 and 2 n -1. We take the ciphertext c to be c := ql + 2q2 + "'" + 2n-lqn.
Following [2] , we decrypt as follows. Let c be the ciphertext, so we can express c in the form (6) to obtain g = (ql,---, qn). 
Here the function findcoset(g, i) returns the value t 1 + 2t 2 where
The decryption algorithm presented here differs from that given in [2] by our drawing together that part of the algorithm concerning itself with finding the h i into a separate subroutine findcoset. That part of the algorithm in [2] which corresponds to findcoset uses knowledge of the elements a 1 ..... a n to calculate h i. We give a generalized algorithm which implements findcoset which only uses knowledge of the chain of subgroups (1). This decryption algorithm is of comparable speed to the decryption algorithm presented in [2] .
For j = 0 to 3 do:
findcoset(g,i) [i >-4 ]
The justification for this algorithm is (2) when i < n/4 -1 and (3) otherwise. Examining the first half of the decryption algorithm, we find that the only properties of the subspaces Gk, 1 < k < n/4 -1, that the algorithm uses are:
Hence any subspaces satisfying (P1)-(P3) may replace subspaces G1,..., an/4_ 1 in the deeryption algorithm. Note that an analogous list of properties exists for subspaces Gn/4,..., Gn/2_ 2, but we defer considering this list until later.
We are now ready to begin cryptanalysis of the system.
An Equivalent Set of Private-Key Blocks
Let K be a private key. We may, of course, assume that we know the public key associated with K. Suppose that we also know the function f. This section describes the construction of the blocks of a private key K* which decrypts messages encrypted using the public key associated with K. Thus the private key K* is equivalent to the private key K. For integers i and h such that 1 <_ i <_ n/4 -1 and 0 < h _< 3, define the vector ~*[i, h] by
We also define, for integers i, s, and h such that 1 < i < n/4 -1, 0 < h <_ 3, and 0 < s _< 3, the vector
Finally, we define blocks AT, *. by
where i is such that 1 < i < n/4 -1, and blocks -~,h by
where i and h are such that n/4 < i < n/2 -2 and 0 < h < 3. We can now construct a key K* defined by {.~ I i < k < n/4 -1}, {Ai--* ' h I (n/4) < i < n/2 --2, 0 __< h < 3}, f, and the chain (1). We show that K* is a valid private key and furthermore that the public key associated with K* is the same as the public key associated with K.
Theorem.
The key K* defined by 
H-'= -ff*[i,s]hl~ <i < ~--2,0<s,h <3
(fl[ n )
= i,s]hll<_i<-~--l,O<s,h<3
can be constructed using only our knowledge of the public key.
(11)
The Beginning of the Decryption Process
In this section we analyse the top half of the chain of subgroups (1) and show how to construct the top half of an equivalent chain of subgroups, which can be used to decrypt half of any ciphertext. If we write Pi := si + 4hi, then an equivalent problem is to find S1, 9 9 ", $n/4-1, hl, 9 " ", hn/4-1 such that
By the previous section, we may write
The construction of the top half of an equivalent chain of subgroups enables us to find the integers h I ..... hn/4_ 1 in expression (12). From Section 2 we know that the only properties of the subgroups Gk, where
1, that the algorithm uses when decrypting using key K are (P1)-(P3) given in (7). Analogously, the algorithm decrypting using key K* uses only the properties: Using definition (11) of H in Section 2, we may write (Q2) more succinctly as property (Q2'):
We define subspaces G~ where 1 <_ k <_ n/4 -1 by
+H.
Note that the definition of G~ depends only on knowledge of the public key. Clearly, G~ satisfies properties (Q1) and (Q2'). To see that G~ also satisfies property (Q3), observe that G~ < G k (since G k satisfies (Q1) and (Q2')). Then, for any s, s' ~ {0, 1, 2, 3} such that
hence that s = s'. So G~ satisfies (Q3). In consequence of subspaces G~ satisfying properties (Q1), (Q2'), and (Q3), we may use them in place of subspaces G k in the first half of the decryption algorithm. Since the definitions of G~ and ~*[i, s] depend only on the public key, we may use the first half of the decryption algorithm as presented in Section 1 to find the correct values of h a ..
... hn/4_ 1 o
Hence we have already recovered half the bits of the message. We recover the remainder in the next section.
The End of the Decryption Process
Using the methods of the previous section, we have reduced the problem of decryption to determining the decomposition
where the vector g and the integers ha,..., hn/4_ a are known. We first give, and justify, an algorithm for finding a one-to-one function , and a function f* entirely from the public key. Since these objects form a private key equivalent to the original private key, we are now able to decrypt an arbitrary cryptogram.
Conclusions
In this paper we have shown Minghua Qu and Vanstone's FGM public-key cryptosystem [2] to be insecure. We were able to do this by noting that a generalized decryption algorithm exists that does not depend directly on the basis chosen. Thus there is redundant information in the private key given in [2] and there are many equivalent private keys. We have given a method to construct one of these equivalent private keys from the public key that is computationally similar to the original decryption algorithm, that is essentially calculating linear dependences of sets of vectors. We also note that even as a private-key cryptosystem, FGM is insecure against a chosen plaintext attack since the vector sums of cryptograms of a few suitably chosen plaintexts will give us much of the information we used to attack the public-key cryptosystem.
The construction at the heart of FGM can be generalized to an arbitrary group. This generalization is known as a logarithmic signature and has been proposed as the basis of cryptosystems in arbitrary groups, for example the Permutation Group Mappings (PGM) cryptosystem [1] . However, all general families of logarithmic signatures so far proposed for use in these systems are in fact transversal logarithmic signatures or simple modifications of them. A transversal logarithmic signature is based on the unique decomposition of an element of a group into a product of coset representatives associated with a tower of subgroups. In a cryptosystem based on a transversal logarithmic signature, the security of the system is based on the secrecy of this tower of subgroups. In the FGM cryptosystem the chain of vector subspaces (1) is nothing more than this tower. Our method for finding an equivalent private key does not use any of the linearity inherent in Z~, but instead treats Z~ as an abstract group and so is really a method of finding a suitable tower of subgroups. Thus our analysis is applicable to a transversal logarithmic signature in an arbitrary group and so throws doubt on the security of any cryptosystem which relies on transversal logarithmic signatures.
